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Brief of Duck Creek Irrigation Company, a Corpora-
tion, in Answer to Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The plaintiff has asked for a rehearing, specifying two 
grounds: 
1. It is claimed that the Supreme Court mandate "to 
award to the irrigation company the ordinary flow of Duck 
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Creek which is controlled, diverted and used by means of 
dams as presently constructed", is indefinite and unenforce-
able. 
2. It is further asserted by plaintiff that this Court 
erred in approving findings that one second foot of water 
should be a warded to each 50 acres of land and that there-
fore the Duck Creek Irrigation Company should be awarded 
a prior right of not less than six second feet. 
It appears that these grounds are somewhat inconsis-
tent, for complaint is made of an alleged indefinite award 
in one and a definite a ward in another. 
The position of the defendant, Duck Creek Irrigation 
Company, and we think the effect of this Court's decision, 
is as follows: 
1. The mandate is not indefinite or unenforceable, but 
the decision adequately establishes the law of the case to 
enable and require the lower court to enter findings, conclu-
sions and judgment and the mandate is in accord with the 
practice in numerous cases. The plaintiff has misconceived 
the effect of the mandate and the opinion, but if there is 
any uncertainty it can be readily corrected by this Court 
by inserting in the mandate the specific amount of the pri-
mary right between six second feet indicated by the opin-
ion as the minimum and the amount of eight second feet 
claimed in the brief of Duck Creek Irrigation Company. 
2. This Court did not err in approving findings that 
one second foot of water should be awarded to each fifty 
acres of land and that, therefore, the Duck Creek Irriga-
tion Company should be awarded a prior right of not less 
than six second feet, since the trial court's findings as to 
duty of water were questioned neither by plaintiff nor de-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
fendant on this appeal and since the record abundantly es-
tablishes such duty. 
The decision of this Court as applied to the record is 
regular and proper and will enable and require the lower 
court to enter findings and decree consistent with the de-
cision and without any uncertainty therein; the record would 
authorize the Supreme Court in specifically directing what 
the award of the. primary right must be, but it is entirely 
proper for it to direct that the ordinary flow, not less than 
six second feet, be a warded to Duck Creek as a primary 
right, leaving the District Court to award a greater amount 
up to the eight second feet claimed by the company should 
it determine that this is in accordance with the record. We 
think that the Supreme Court should have specifically re-
quired the award of eight second feet as a primary right 
instead of not less than six second feet; but plaintiff is in 
no position to complain of this. 
ARGUMENT 
In general 
There seems no merit whatsoever in plaintiff's petition 
for rehearing, unless it is that this Court should m()dify its 
decision to direct specifically that the lower court award 
eight second feet to Duck Creek Irrigation Company as a 
prior right, with the percentage of the high water right as 
now provided. If this is not done, the decision should stand 
to the effect that it should award not less than six second 
feet ·as a prior right, with such additional amount, if any, 
·which the trial court may may find consistently with the 
decision comprises the_ ordinary flow appropriated as a pri-
mary right by Duck Creek, together with the present per-
centage of the high water. 
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The plaintiff first says that the mandate is uncertain 
and then objects because it specifically requires the award 
of a duty of fifty acres per second foot. We think that 
the form of the court's mandate is usual and proper, but if 
any change should be made, this would require or justify 
no rehearing; the Court should simply direct the award of 
eight second feet, or such other amount in excess of six sec-
ond feet as the evidence in its judgment requires. If it is 
left to the trial court as under the present mandate to fix 
the amount in excess of six second feet, we are confident 
that the record abundantly establishes that this primary 
right should be eight; in the event that this Court wishes 
to fix the specific amount of the primary right in excess 
of six, we have cited below some of the evidence upon the 
basis of which this should be done; and other evidence is re-
ferred to in the opinion of this Court. 
I. 
The mandate is not indefinite or unenforceable, but the de-
cision adequately establishes the law of the case, and defi-
nitely guides the lower court to the entry of revised find-
ings and decree in accordance therewith. 
The vice of plaintiff's argwnent on this point is that it 
seizes upon a sentence or two in the opinion and disregards 
the decision in its entirety. The entire opinion must be 
considered in determining its effect, but the following ex-
cerpts will be adequate to show that plaintiff's petition is 
not well taken: 
"The controversy herein is over rights to the wa-
ter of Duck Creek, just south of Benjamin, Utah Coun-
ty. The trial court decreed to the Duck Creek Irri-
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gation Company, appellant herein, a basic flow of two 
second feet and ordered the rest of the stream divided 
tween the parties: 300/368 to appellant and 68j368 to 
respondent during the irrigation season; and 400/568 
to appellant and 168 j568 to respondent during the non-
irrigation season. . . . Appellant attacks this de-
cree as not being supported by the evidence. It con-
tends that it and its stockholders now do, and from 
time immemorial (at least back to 1870) have owned, 
controlled and used all of the 'ordinary flow' of the 
stream and that the only right or use plaintiff or his 
predecessors have ever had in it is to excess overflow 
water which was not caught and controlled by appel-
lant's dams and used by them and which therefore 
naturally found its way on the plaintiff's lower land 
to the west . . . . 
''It is established by the evidence without dispute 
that the irrigation company and its predecessros, both 
long before and ever since 1903, by means of the two 
upper dams, did impound, control and use all of the 
ordiriary flow of the stream, and also diverted and 
used a portion of the high water to pasture land; and 
that the only use of waters of Duck Creek by the plain-
tiff and his predecessors was that in times of high wa-
ter the excess which was not so caught and used by 
the irrigation company naturally escaped down the 
stream and onto the plaintiff's lower land to the west 
and was there used . . . . It is therefore an in-
quiry of prime importance as to whether the two c.f.s. 
allowed the appellant amounted to the 'ordinary flow' 
of the stream as always used by the appellant. The 
evidence seems conclusive that it was not. 
I 
''J. W. Stewart, another witness for the appellant, 
said that the irrigation company's two dams (Upper 
Dam and Duck Creek Dam) would take care of about 
six to seven second feet and that after they began to 
irrigate they would continue to take practically the 
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whole stream, and that after the spring high water 
the stream would continue to decline down to two or 
three c.f.s. and by July be practically dwindled out. 
There was other testimony that these two dams would 
handle as much as ten second feet which would be used 
by the irrigation company as long as it was available. 
All of the witnesses, both for the plaintiff and defend-
ants, who testified on that subject said that a stream 
of 2 c.f.s. was practically valueless for irrigation in ap-
pellant's irrigation system, the reason being that the 
land was so near level that such stream would not be 
enough water to be useful and in fact would scarcely 
even reach the land further to the north. 
"Further indication that the two second feet 
awarded to appellant is inadequate is as follows: The 
Court found the duty of water there to be 1 c.f.s. for 
fifty acres; he also found that the stockholders of ap-
pellant company had irrigated 300 acres of land with 
this water. Upon that basis, it would appear that they 
ought to have a primary right to at least six second 
feet of water, together with the right to use such pro-
portion of the 'high water' as they customarily used 
for irrigation of pasture land before letting the excess 
run on down to Bishop's land. 
". . . . Appellant has the right to all of the 
water in Duck Creek up to the 'ordinary flow' as con-
trolled by their dams as presently constituted and to 
participate in the use of waters in excess thereof on 
the basis found by the trial court. The only right 
shown in plaintiff is to participate in the use of waters 
not so used by defendants. 
". . . . The trial court viewed the premises 
and found that there was such irrigation ditches; and 
on conflicting evidence determined a prescriptive right 
existed in the plaintiff to use the ditches and laterals 
from Duck Creek Dam, and this finding must be sus-
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tained. However, the right to use them is limited to 
be consistent with the evidence concerning the use es-
tablishing such prescriptive rights, that it, to the di-
version and conveyance of excess overflow water 
through the ditches in such manner as not to interfere 
with the use thereof by the owners. 
''It appears necessary to remand this case to the 
District Court to modify the decree: 
"1. To award to the irrigation company the or-
dinary flow of Duck Creek which is controlled, di-
verted and used by means of dams as presently consti-
tuted. 
"2. To limit the use by plaintiff of the ditches 
and laterals of the irrigation company and its . stock-
holders as hereinabove indicated. 
"3. To omit any award to Carl Lindstrom. 
''In other respects the judgment of the trial court 
is affirmed. Costs to appellant." 
It will be noted that this decision disposes of every is-
sue on the appeal and directs what is to be done. It sets up 
a guide to the trial court to enter a revised decree, award-
ing the ordinary flow to Duck Creek which it determines 
is not less than six second feet. It limits the use of 
ditches, consistent with the awards mentioned. It sustains 
the percentage awards of the high water between the par-
ties. It strikes the award to Carl Lindstrom, and in other 
respects directs that the judgment shall stand. Any trial 
court desiring to follow this mandate would have no trouble 
whatever in entering the revised decree in conformance 
thereto as directed. If it should fail to do so, which is un-
thinkable, the matter could be corrected on a further ap-
peal. This court could have fixed the flow specifically at 
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six, seven or eight second feet, but apparently preferred to 
lay down the law, and the minimum the evidence would 
warrant, and leave to the trial court the fixing of a greater 
amount if it so determined on the evidence. The taking of 
no further evidence was directed, nor is it necessary, as 
plaintiff concedes in his brief. This Court could upon this 
petition set the defendant's primary right at six second feet 
which it has held to be the minimum that is authorized by 
the evidence, or at eight second feet as we believe the evi-
dence requires, but the fact that it has left, consistent with 
its opinion, the fixing of the upper limit to the trial court 
does not authorize plaintiff to charge that the decision vio-
lates the principles of the cases which he cites. No one is 
contending that the judgment will be left to award simply 
"the ordinary flow." Certainly it is to be expected that if 
this Court does not specify the amount above six second 
feet, the trial court in response to the mandate of this opin-
ion will do so. 
Plaintiff's authorities are wholly immaterial. Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 76, provides: 
(a) DECISION OF SUPREME COURT: Opin-
ion to be in writing. The Supreme Court may reverse, 
affirm or modify any order or judgment appealed from 
and may, in case the findings in any case are incom-
plete in any respect, order the court from which the 
appeal was taken to add to, modify or complete the 
findings so as to make the same conform to the issues 
presented and the facts as the same may be found to 
be by the trial court from the evidence, and may direct 
the trial court to enter judgment in accordance with 
the findings when corrected as aforesaid, or may di-
rect a new trial in any case, or further proceeding to 
be had . . . " 
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The foregoing provision is substantially the same as 
was contained in Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 104-41-
23. 
It was held under the latter section that the Supreme 
Court may modify the decree of the court below, as well 
as the findings of fact, whether any basis for such modifi-
cation be found in the findings or not. Salina Creek Irri-
gation Co. v. Stock Co., 7 Utah 456-60, 27 Pac. 578; aff'd 
163 U. S. 109, 41 L. ed 90, 16 S. Ct. 1036. While the Su-
preme Court itself in an equity case may enter a judgment 
instead of remanding the case, Melen v. Vonder-Horst Bros., 
44 Utah 300, 140 Pac. 130, it may also remand the case for 
the trial cow~t to enter judgment in accordance with the 
Supreme Court mandate. Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 109, 
39 P.2d 755, superseded by 88 Utah 131, 48 P.2d 473; 88 
Utah 146, 54 P.2d 1213, and where it is more convenient 
to make and enter conclusions of law and judgment in the 
district court the Supreme Court will do no more than in-
dicate and direct what the findings, conclusions and judg-
ments shall be, and remand. Wheelwright v. Roman, 50 
Utah 10, 165 Pac. 513. In Big Cottonwood Lower Canal · 
Co. v. Cook, 73 Utah 383, 274 Pac. 454, the Supreme Court 
simply modified the judgment of the lower court by in-
creasing the quantity of water allowed to appellant by the 
trial court. 
Moreover, in Mountain Lake Min. Co. v. Midway Irr. 
Co., 47 Utah 371, 154 Pac. 584, after reversal and remand 
to the trial court with directions to enter judgment, but 
before the remittitur had gone do~, the Supreme Court 
determined that it had ample power to amend its judgment~ 
so as to make it conform to the opinion of the majority of 
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the court. Thus, at this stage in the proceeding, with a pe-
tition for rehearing pending, the Court could, if it desired, 
specify the exact quantity of water the Duck Creek Irriga-
tion Company was entitled to, instead of remanding the 
case for the trial court to proceed in accordance with the 
opinion, to award the primary right of six second feet of 
water, or more, depending upon what was· determined to 
be the ordinary flow if this exceeded six second feet. 
In Wheelwright v. Roman, supra, the form of there-
mand was, ''The findings of fact and conclusions of law, so 
far as inconsistent with this opinion, are set aside, and the 
judgment reversed. The cause is remanded to the district 
court, with directions to make findings of fact and con-
clusions of law in accordance with the views expressed in 
this opinion, and to enter judgment," (etc.). In Salina 
Creek Irr. Co. v. Salina Stock Co., et al, supra, the mandate 
was: "This case is remanded, with directions to the court 
below to modify the decree and findings so as to conform 
to this opinion." 
In Wherritt v. Dennis, 48 Utah 309, 159 Pac. 534, the 
court said, "In view that this is an equity case we can di-
rect what orders should be made in order to fully dispose 
of the case. The judgment is therefore reversed, and, inso-
far as the findings of fact and conclusions of law are in 
conflict with our views herein, they are vacated and set 
aside, and the district court of Wasatch County is directed 
to make findings and conclusions of law to conform to the 
views herein expressed and to enter a decree ordering 
" (etc.) In Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co. 
v. Cook, et al, supra the mandate of the court was worded 
as follows: ''It is ordered that the findings and decree be 
modified by increasing the quantity of water to which de-
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fendant, Heber Cook, is entitled to use for irrigation pur-
poses from 4 acre feet per annum for the irrigation of 1 
acre of land to 6 acre feet of water per annum for the irri-
gation of 1 :Y2 acres of land. In all other respects the de-
cree and judgment are approved and affirmed. The cause 
is remanded to the district court, with directions to modify 
the findings and decree to conform herewith. Appellants 
to recover costs." 
In Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 146, 54 P.2d 1213, upon 
the petition for rehearing filed by one of the defendants, the 
Supreme Court made modifications by way of additions to 
its opinion, and in view of such modifications denied the 
petition for rehearing. 
The appellate court may order the necessary modifi-
cations to be made by the lower court instead of making 
the correction itself, it being often held discretionary with 
the appellate court either to make the modification on its 
own records or to remand the case to the lower court with 
specific directions to that court to make such modifications. 
5 CJS, "Appeal and Error", Sec. 1874 (a), (b), p. 1360. 
In the absence of statute to the contrary no particular form 
of mandate is required as long as proper effect is given to 
the decision of the court. ·Ibid, Sec. 1961, p. 1491. On re-
mand the lower court has jurisdiction to take such action 
as law and justice may require under the circumstances as 
long as it is not inconsistent with the mandate and judg-
ment of the appellate court. Ibid, Sec. 1965, p. 1510. 
It thus appears that under the present mandate and 
opinion the district court could readily proceed in compli-
ance therewith to enter modifications to the decree award-
ing Duck Creek Irrigation Company six second feet of wa-
ter as a primary right, or such additional amount as it 
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might find from the evidence before it to comprise the or-
dinary flow used by said defendant in years past as a prior 
right, by modifying the provisions as to ditch rights accord-
ingly and by eliminating the award to Lindstrom, and by 
leaving the award of excess water as in the lower court's 
decree provided. 
The trial court should experience no difficulty what-
soever, in entering judgment in accordance with the views 
expressed in this opinion. However, since there is only 
one uncertainty complained of in the motion for rehearing, 
and in view of the above authorities, the Supreme Court 
may, if it chooses, specify whether the primary right should 
be six second feet or such other amount as it determines, 
and upon such modification the petition for rehearing should 
likewise be denied. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court refers to various 
phases of the evidence and states upon that basis it would 
. appear that the stockholders of the company ought to have 
a primary right to at least six second feet of water, together 
with the right to use such proportion of the "high water" 
as they customarily used for irrigation of pasture land be-
fore letting the excess run on down to Bishop's land, and 
it is specifically concluded that ''appellant has the right to 
all of the water in Duck Creek up to the 'ordinary flow' as 
controlled by their dams as presently constituted and to 
participate in the use of waters in excess thereof on the 
basis found by the trial court. The only right shown in 
plaintiff is to participate in the use of waters not so used 
by defendants." 
We shall not attempt to repeat the outline of facts 
contained in our principal brief on the amow1t to which the 
company is entitled. The opinion of this Court refers to cer-
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tain evidence which it is believed shows conclusively that 
the primary right before pro-ration should be more than 
six second feet. We direct the Court's attention also to 
the following pages of transcript which indicate clearly, we 
believe, that the primary right should be eight second feet. 
Plaintiff's counsel during the trial conceded that plain-
tiff claimed no rights to, or from, the Upper Dam or in the 
ditches leading therefrom (T. 20-21). Stevens testified 
that Duck Creek Dam from June first on is practically a 
tight dam, that whenever the water gets low, Duck Creek 
is a tight dam (T. 77). For the water that he used down 
at the Stevens Dam he depended largely after June first on 
the seepage water that runs into Duck Creek below the 
Duck Creek Dam (T. 84). Stevens' judgment was that the 
available flow at the Duck Creek Dam along the first part 
of May would be from ten to twenty second feet and that 
it would go down to five second feet about the fifth of June 
(T. 102). Stevens' son, Howard, testified that when the 
company's stockholders started to water the grain, from 
then on, Stevens didn't interfere with them if they found 
they were using it. They started to irrigate grain about 
the middle of May to the first of June (T. 239). He fur-
ther testified that he never did go up and talk to the men 
on the Upper Dam about turns; he had no interest in it 
(T. 249), and that whenever he took the water out of Duck 
Creek, the stream was big-generally ten second feet or 
better (T. 250). (It is to be remembered that his obser-
vations were at the Duck Creek Dam, after the Upper Dam 
stream had been taken out.) Bishop, the plaintiff, testi-
fied that there was ten second feet of water in the lower 
dam when he turned it on his meadow, but he didn't know 
what was at the Upper Dam. 
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J. W. Stewart testified that in the early days there 
would be three-fourths of a mile north and south and a 
mile east and west irrigated by the predecessors of the 
Duck Creek Irrigation Company, and that in the early part 
of the irrigation season they w<;>uld take out from six to 
seven second feet in both dams (T. 365) and that they would 
take all the water there whenever they took it out (T. 366). 
During the low water season of the year, they took all the 
water out of both the Upper Dam and the Lower Dam when 
they would get to irrigating; he never saw the time when 
they wouldn't take it all (T. 375). The size of the ditch 
that they used to divert water from the Upper Dam was 
about five feet across the top and about three or four feet 
deep. That was in in about 1880. He saw flowing ~ that 
ditch about four or five second feet (T. 464). If there 
would be no high water there would be no hay (T. 466). 
Mrs. Charles W. Hickman testified that the earliest time 
for irrigation she used about four second feet of water at 
the Upper Dam (T. 394). Clay Ashworth said the water 
was put on the pasture along in April (T. 514). They used 
to irrigate the hay more in May and June. It depended on 
the season. Other than hay and grass-land, they ordi-
narily began to irrigate down there the latter part of May, 
that is, for grain. That is about right for alfalfa, too (T. 
515). George W. Tucker said they started to irrigate on 
the average in May (T. 528). Francis L. Uu.ndell says the 
stream starts to dwindle in April as a general rule (T. 572-
573). At the point where his father diverted water, he 
would take all the water as early as the middle of May, so 
that there would be none flowing by the dam (T. 576). As 
a general rule the water would decrease to the point where 
it was all used for irrigation at the two dams as early as 
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the first of May to the fifteenth of May, taking that as an 
average. The only time there would be any overflow at 
either dam would be if they would get a heavy rainfall and 
a quick flush that might last for three or four days (T. 589). 
LaVon E. Payne said that after the first of May practically 
all the water has been taken out except the excess when 
it has rained quite a bit and it has come down in floods (T. 
712). Ifu hadn't been able to water anywhere near all his 
place after the irrigation season started. The irrigation 
season starts possibly the earliest before the first of May; 
on the pasture land earlier than that (T. 716). The latest 
time to begin watering and irrigating crops would be the 
first of June. High to them meant more than they could 
handle in their ditches. Other than the grass land, they 
have been irrigating about the first of May (T. 717). En-
gineer Jacobs testified that a good stream economically 
used would be three or four second feet, and a good irri-
gator would handle five or six (T. 434). Under this testi-
mony, at the very least the quantity at each dam would be 
three or four second feet as a priority, or a total of six to 
eight second feet and as a maximum, twelve, since it would 
be expected that with water available those having control 
would use at least such minimum amount at each dam. 
The capacity of the company's ditc}?.es from each dam is 
ten second feet or a total capacity of twenty second feet 
(T. 835-838). 
This Court, we believe, should find and determine that 
the amount of the Duck Crek Irrigation Company's prior 
right is between six and eight second feet of water, with 
the right to pro-rate in the high water as determined by 
the district court, or should direct the lower court to enter 
findings accordingly. We believe that this is just what this 
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Court has done in its present opinion, leaving to the lower 
court the fixing of the exact amount of primary right be-
tween six and eight second feet. 
B. 
This Court did not err in approving findings that one sec-
ond foot of water should be awarded to each fifty acres of 
land, and therefore the Duck C~k Irrigation Company 
should be awarded a prior right of not less than six second 
feet, since the trial court's findings as to duty of water 
were questioned neither by plaintiff nor defendant on this 
appeal, and since the record abundantly establishes such 
duty. 
The plaintiff now contends that the Court erred in 
approving findings that one second foot of water should be 
a warded to each fifty acres of land, "and that therefore the 
Duck Creek Irrigation Company should be awarded a prior 
right of not less than six second feet." 
This argument is significant, because it shows that the 
mandate of the Supreme Court is not uncertain in the mind 
of plaintiff's counsel ·in that it holds that the primary right 
of Duck Creek is at least six second feet. The Supreme 
Court, except as expressly held, has approved the findings 
of the trial court.' One of those findings is that the duty 
of water is fifty acres per second foot; the other is that the 
irrigation company had 300 acres of cultivated land and 
134 acres of pasture land, or a total of 434 acres. 
Plaintiff did not question the finding on duty of water 
or assign any error with respect thereto. While plaintiff 
referred to Engineer Jacobs' testimony as to a possible duty 
of water at seventy acres, he did not assign error or attack 
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the court's findings on duty of water, and in fact, sought to 
rely thereon in trying to justify his award. Respondent's 
cross appeal was directed entirely to different points (See 
p. 40 of his original brief). It is too late now, on a motion 
for rehearing to seek a cross appeal on a new ground or 
assign additional error. A finding not assigned as error is 
not presented for review. Mountain Lake Mining Co. v. 
Midvale Irr. Co.~ supra. 
Our original brief is referred to for detailed citations 
to the record. The findings of the trial court on duty of 
water and this Court's decision recognizes the record cited. 
We might add without undue repetition that under the ori-
ginal incorporation the water was divided evenly between 
the Upper and the Lower Dams. There were almost three 
times as many acres under the Lower Dam as under the 
Upper Dam. The original plan was to have one share of 
water per acre of land, but the Upper Dam, having between 
100 and 150 acres of cultivated land under it, got about 234 
shares and the Lower Dam having about three times as 
much land-approximately 350 acres or more-got an equal 
number of shares. Neither got as much water as they 
could beneficially use, but they divided all the water be-
tween them (T. 326-328, 629, 657). 
Much is made by plaintiff of Engineer Jacobs' testi-
mony that the duty of water would be seventy acres per 
second foot. Counsel disregards the basic meaning of duty, 
which involves the assumption of a steady flow. The evi-
dence indicates .that the stream in question varies from an 
abundance to almost nothing and the variation is not only 
betwen seasons but over relatively short periods during the 
irrigation season when there is rain. Jacobs, himself, tes-
tified that he assumed that the water would be available 
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as needed in estimating his duty, and that he thought that 
at the rate he testified to, the land would need a steady 
stream. The Court did not have to disregard Jacobs' tes-
timony to arrive at the duty of fifty acres per second foot, 
because Jacobs assumed a steady stream. Moreover, the 
court himself inspected the land, and also had the benefit 
of practical irrigators showing that there. was not enough 
water to get over the ground. The case of Sharp v. Whit-
more, 51 Utah 14, 168 Pac. 273, is cited by plaintiff to show 
that a decree must be certain. With this we agree, and we 
say that based on the Supreme Court's mandate, the de-
cree can and will be made certain by the trial court by fol-
lowing the directions of the Supreme Court, or this Court 
can on this motion, fix the definite amount without leaving 
it to the trial court. But the significant thing about the 
Whitmore case is that in that case the trial court did follow 
literally the ideas of the expert witness Tanner on the duty 
of water, and failed to properly analyze such testimony and 
to give effect to the testimony of practical irrigators. This 
is the error which plaintiff's counsel would have this Court 
invite, but in the Whitmore case, the trial court's award of 
four second fet, based upon a construction of the expert's 
testimony as to duty of water was raised by .the Supreme 
Court to five second feet, the lower court being thus re-
versed. Here we have a .finding of duty by the trial court 
which is based upon a fair analysis of the expert's testi-
mony, as well as upon the testimony of practical irrigators 
and the judge's own personal inspection of the land in ques-
tion. Certainly the contention of the plaintiff, made at 
this stage, or at any other, which would overthrow that 
finding, is not meritorious. 
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CONCLUSION 
We do not question that the award of a water right 
in general terms is not proper, and we do not question the 
cases cited by plaintiff, but he has set up a straw man.. The 
decision of the Supreme Court definitely establishes the law 
of the case and directs entry of judgment in a manner that 
no court could misunderstand, simply leaving to the trial 
court the fixing of the ordinary flow at not less than six 
second feet, and in such additional amount as it believes 
the record to justify, consistent with the Supreme Court's 
opinion. The objections to the finding on duty of water 
now made by plaintiff are not meritorious because plaintiff 
at no previous time attacked such finding, but relied upon 
them in seeking to sustain his award, and for the further 
reason that the evidence abundantly establishes it. Since 
the duty of water as determined by the trial court and the 
acreage as fixed by the trial court are unimpeached by 
plaintiff (not less than 300 acres of crop land with an ad-
ditional134 acres of pasture land) the· amount of the award 
of the primary right during the irrigation season beginning 
May first is definite, as far as plaintiff is concerned. That 
the irrigation company claims that this acreage is greater 
cannot avail the plaintiff. 
However, to save argument before the trial court, 
should plaintiff be disposed to further argue claimed uncer-
tainties, the Supreme Court, as it has done in other cases 
cited above, could, if it chooses, modify its closing mandate 
to have the same express what its effect really is in view 
of the whole opinion. With or without such modification, 
the motion for rehearing should be denied. There would 
be no purpose whatsoever in a rehearing since nothing new 
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has been raised which has not been fully argued and de-
cided. The closing paragraph might be in the following 
fonn: 
It appears necessary to remand this case to the 
District Court to modify findings, conclusions and de-
cree in accordance with this opinion: 
(1) To award to the irrigation company the or-
dinary flow of Duck Creek which is controlled, diverted 
and used by means of dams as presently constituted, 
which amount is hereby fixed at six (or seven, or eight 
second feet, as this Court may decide) , together with 
the perecentage of the high water flow as awarded by 
the trial court and as heretofore referred to in this 
opinion. 
( 2) To limit the use by the plaintiff of the ditches 
and laterals of the irrigation company and its stock-
holders as hereinabove indicated. 
( 3) To omit any award to Carl Lindstrom. 
In other respects the findings, conclusions and 
judgment of the trial court are affirmed. Costs to 
appellant. 
As indicated above, we do not believe such modifica-
tion to be necessary, but it would be entirely proper and 
might avoid further argument. It would also be proper 
for this Court to enter its own revised findings without re-
manding the case, though this would not be usual. 
In any event, the plaintiff's motion for rehearing is 
without merit and should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON 
Attorneys for Duck Creek 
Irrigation Company. 
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